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Since the international community agreed 
to hold a conference on the establishment 
of a Middle East zone free of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery 
vehicles (DVs) in May 2010, the regional 
political landscape has changed dramati-
cally. All states of the region are called to 
attend the 2012 Middle East Conference 
(MEC). Various factors make this a complex 
initiative, including the earth-shattering 
events associated with the so-called Arab 
Spring that have the potential to transform 
both national political systems and the 
regional security landscape. This POLICY 
BRIEF attempts to analyze whether and 
how the Arab Spring might affect regional 
foreign and security policies in the context 
of conﬂ ict formations and arms dynamics. 
This analysis is important in order to assess 
the interests and positions of Arab states in 
participating constructively in the Middle 
East Conference.
The Relevance of the Arab 
Spring for the Middle East
The tragic self-immolation of Mohamed 
Bouazizi, a young fruit vendor, in December 
2010 sparked a series of unprecedented 
demonstrations in Tunisia. The success of 
the protests led to a wave of unrest, which 
spread to Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, and 
Yemen, and then to other countries in the 
region. The causes varied from country to 
country but mostly derived from domestic 
issues such as: a lack of democracy, human 
rights violations, wide-spread corruption, 
economic decline, unemployment, extreme 
poverty, rising food prices, and a number 
of demographic factors, such as a large 
percentage of educated and dissatisﬁ ed 
young people and the centralized systems 
that marginalize parts of the population 
outside capital cities. In some countries 
protests were aimed at the displacement of 
the regime, whereas in others demonstra-
tions demanded the improvement of living 
conditions while leaving the principal 
foundations of the state unchallenged. 
Accordingly, the ruling elite responded to 
the protesters differently: from introducing 
top-down reforms and making efforts to 
‘buy’ social peace to repression and armed 
violence.1
As of August 2012, governments have been 
overthrown in four countries: Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Tunisian 
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali ﬂ ed 
the country in January 2011 in the wake of 
the uprisings. In Egypt, President Hosni 
Mubarak resigned in February 2011 after 
the Tahrir Square protests, ending his 
30-year presidency. Libyan leader Muammar 
Gaddafi was overthrown after massive 
domestic revolts and international military 
intervention and was killed on October 20, 
2011. Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh 
resigned and his successor Abdal-Rabah 
Mansour Al-Hadi formally replaced him 
in February 2012. Still protests continue 
for self-determination of the southern part 
and equality for the majority of the Yemeni 
population. 
Protests in Syria demanding the ousting of 
President Bashar Al-Assad began in March 
2011 and have rapidly developed into 
a nationwide uprising. The demonstra-
tions have resulted in an ongoing, violent 
conﬂ ict – in fact a civil war – between 
Assad loyalist and opposition forces. 
Bahraini protests aimed at achieving 
greater political freedom and equality for 
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The transformations broadly grouped under 
the term Arab Spring have shaken the founda-
tions of a variety of Middle East regimes. This 
POLICY BRIEF provides an overview of different 
cases where changes of and within the regime 
have taken place, as well as yet unsolved situa-
tions, with a view to the upcoming Middle East 
Conference. 
Although the lack of progress in the Palestinian-
Israeli conﬂict as well as the international debate 
over the Iranian nuclear program are still conten-
tious issues, the Arab Spring uprisings and their 
aftermath may provide a new context in which 
arms control initiatives could be more successful. 
It is too optimistic to think that existing dilemmas 
can be easily resolved in this new and changing 
environment, but the Arab Spring may provide 
strong momentum for change.
For the Facilitator of the Middle East Conference 
and his team the following factors should form a 
checklist of issues requiring immediate attention: 
how domestic events positively or negatively affect 
the decisions of involved actors; which countries 
are to take a leading and constructive role in the 
MEC process; how to beneﬁ t from a more visible 
Arab League; and ﬁ nally, the Facilitator and his 
team should not ignore those countries which 
so far have not been affected by the Arab Spring 
but which will nevertheless be important for the 
Middle East Conference process. n
This POLICY BRIEF draws on the contributions 
of a number of participants from the ACADEMIC 
PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST workshop held in 
Barcelona, Spain, from January 24–27, 2012. 
Participants came from a number of Arab 
countries as well as Turkey, Israel, the United 
States, Germany, Spain, and Hungary.
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In our view, a transformation process is 
characterized by an attempt to change 
the political ‘structures’ deﬁ ned as the 
rules and principles to the establishment 
of political power.3 Three main phases of 
transformation can be identiﬁ ed: opening 
up of the established regime, the transition 
to democracy (including the displacement 
of the authoritarian regime and the process 
of institutionalization), and democratic 
consolidation.4 These phases do not present 
a precise model, but they do serve as a guide 
to describe changes in political structures 
and within them. In fact, transformation is 
not necessarily triggered by revolutionary 
attempts: sometimes the governing elite 
may respond to public dissatisfaction by 
introducing reform programs that leave the 
foundations of the political system intact 
(‘changes within the structures’).
The concept of transformation gives us 
a handle on understanding the events 
connected with the Arab Spring. While 
revolutionary attempts did not take 
place everywhere, transformation can be 
witnessed throughout the Middle East. Our 
basic distinction is between transformations 
the majority Shia population were initially 
crushed with the help of the military inter-
vention of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation 
Council) led by Saudi Arabia. Saudi 
Arabia itself also witnessed demonstra-
tions starting in January 2011 and similar 
protests took place in other Gulf states. In 
Jordan continuing protests have already 
led to three changes of cabinet and have 
begun to be directed at the monarch, 
King Abdullah II, and his family.
Revolutions and Transformations: 
Conceptualizing the Events 
of the Arab Spring
The Arab Spring uprisings were quickly 
termed ‘revolutions’ leading to discus-
sions about whether the term was being 
properly applied. One could deﬁ ne 
‘revolution’ as “attempts by subordinate 
groups to transform the social foundations 
of political power.”2 But it remains unclear 
if the Arab Spring uprisings fall into this 
category. Here we shall use the more 
encompassing concept of ‘transformation’ 
to describe the political events taking place 
in Arab countries.
Box No. 1: Old Dilemmas in a New and Changing Environment
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East is an immanent threat. Not only are several countries believed to hold nuclear, 
biological, or chemical armaments and a broad range of delivery vehicles, but disarmament agreements have not been universally accepted 
in the region. Israel has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), whereas Egypt and Syria remain outside the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC). The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) has not been signed by Israel and has yet to be ratiﬁ ed 
by Egypt and Syria. Furthermore, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was not signed by Syria and Saudi Arabia and is awaiting 
ratiﬁ cation by other regional states.
The idea of a regional solution to WMD proliferation in the Middle East is, however, not new: in 1974, Iran and Egypt proposed the estab-
lishment of a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East to the UN General Assembly. Each year for the last three decades, the 
proposal has been unanimously endorsed at the United Nations General Assembly. In 1990, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak extended 
the original proposal as to make the region free of all weapons of mass destruction. 
This proposal was discussed in the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group in the context of Arab-Israeli peace process 
negotiations. The ACRS talks came to a halt when the political context of the peace process changed and because of the unfruitful juxta-
position of “Peace ﬁ rst!” vs. “Disarmament ﬁ rst!”. While Israel maintained that regional peace was the precondition for any disarmament 
initiative, Arab countries claimed that Israeli nuclear disarmament was a precondition for a peace agreement. Despite their failure, the ACRS 
talks have been so far the only joint regional exercise at arms control in the Middle East that is still lacking a common security architecture.
Later, the NPT took up the issue at its 1995 Review and Extension Conference, where the parties decided that progress on a WMD Free 
Zone (including delivery vehicles) should be made in the NPT context. After 15 years, the lack of progress on the zone led Arab countries to 
request implementation of concrete steps at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Accordingly, a regional conference was mandated for 2012 
to discuss the zonal proposal. Under the auspices of Finnish Ambassador Jaakko Laajava (see POLICY BRIEFs No. 1 and No. 6 by Bernd W. 
Kubbig, Roberta Mulas, and Christian Weidlich et al.), it is now in the hands of the Middle Eastern states to shape the MEC and make it 
happen, successful, and sustainable as a regional peace strategy.
Although the lack of progress in the Palestinian-Israeli conﬂ ict as well as the international debate over the Iranian nuclear program are still 
contentious issues, the Arab Spring uprisings and their aftermath may provide a new context in which arms control initiatives could be more 
successful. It is too optimistic to think that existing dilemmas can be easily resolved in this new and changing environment, but the Arab 
Spring may provide strong momentum for change.
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of the regime and within the regime, with 
the former comprising Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Libya and the latter including Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia.5 A third group of states, 
namely Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, has 
witnessed protests challenging the ruling 
authorities without thorough success so 
far. As a result, these countries are plagued 
by violence and political instability. As the 
case studies will show, the countries of the 
region are in different phases of their trans-
formation process. Some have successfully 
displaced their authoritarian rulers, a few 
have started institutionalizing democracy, 
but none are as yet in the process of 
consolidating democracy.
Framework of this POLICY BRIEF
Will developments resulting from the Arab 
Spring events induce Arab countries to be 
more willing to discuss regional and global 
issues, especially matters of arms control? 
Historical evidence suggests that if new 
political forces previously not involved 
in the decision-making process come to 
power, it takes time for them to develop an 
understanding of the international system 
and the obligations entailed. The goal of 
this POLICY BRIEF is to describe, analyze, 
and evaluate those factors which may 
inﬂ uence the foreign and security policy 
as well as decision making of selected 
countries, drawing conclusions as to their 
impact. 
This POLICY BRIEF focuses on how the 
Arab Spring and developments in its wake 
could affect countries’ positions towards 
the Middle East Conference. Three major 
questions need to be addressed: 
What is the current state of political 1. 
transformation (demonstrations/protests, 
change of actors and leadership, political 
reforms, elections, and constitution 
making)?
What impact does the current domestic 2. 
political situation have on the country’s 
foreign and security policies and on 
conﬂ ict structures in the Middle East?
What is the ofﬁ cial position towards 3. 
the Middle East Conference? What is 
its stance with regard to disarmament 
and non-proliferation, and have the 
Arab Spring uprisings resulted in any 
policy changes in these areas?
The countries selected for the case studies 
provide a broad overview of the transfor-
mation processes associated with the Arab 
Spring. We have divided these cases into 
three categories: ﬁ rst, those states such 
as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya which have 
experienced successful displacement of the 
regime; second, those such as Yemen, Syria, 
and Bahrain in the midst of an internal 
political struggle; and, ﬁ nally, states such 
as Jordan and Saudi Arabia which have 
witnessed sporadic demonstrations and 
have implemented partial reforms. To 
complete the picture, we will also provide 
a brief excursus on the impact of the Arab 
Spring upon Israel, Palestine6, and Turkey. 
Some broad conclusions relating to the 
expectations for WMD/DVs arms control 
will also be drawn in view of the upcoming 
Middle East Conference.
Displacement of the Regime: 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya
Tunisia: Sobering Transition
The demonstrations in Tunisia7 began in 
December 2010 and resulted in a wave of 
social and political unrest that led to the 
ousting of longtime President Ben Ali 
in January 2011. Subsequently, the 1959 
Constitution was suspended, Ben Ali’s 
Constitutional Democratic Rally Party 
was abolished, and the country began 
its political transition. Elections for a 
National Constituent Assembly were 
held on October 23, 2011, and Ennahda, 
a ‘moderate’ Islamist party led by Rashid 
Gannouchi, obtained 37 percent of the vote. 
The composition of the current interim 
government, as well as the appointment 
of the President of the Republic and the 
President of the Constituent Assembly, 
reﬂ ect the pact between three political 
forces: Ennahda, the center-left Congress 
for the Republic, and the left-leaning 
Ettakatol. This ‘Tunisian troika’ has a 
comfortable majority in the Constituent 
Assembly, which is charged with drafting 
the country’s new constitution.8 The next 
general election is now scheduled to be 
held in March 2013.
At this point, the greatest challenge for 
Tunisia is responding to the demands for 
democratic representation and freedom, 
the calls for improved living conditions 
as well as social and economic equality. 
As a result, domestic concerns will remain 
at the center of political attention until 
the consolidation of the state. In spite 
of the change in political leadership, 
Tunisian foreign policy is not likely to 
fundamentally alter since the coalition 
partners agree that the partnership with 
the European Union, Maghreb integration, 
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country has always supported multilateral 
initiatives on disarmament.
As far as security issues are concerned, 
the Tunisian army is relatively small and 
poorly equipped. Even if its defense budget 
were increased, Tunisia is very unlikely to 
become a threat in terms of weapons of 
mass destruction proliferation. In regional 
dialogues on disarmament issues, Tunisia’s 
major concerns are illegal trafﬁ cking in 
conventional weapons and the situation 
in the Sahel area rather than in the Middle 
East. 
In short, Tunisia has no reason to oppose 
the upcoming Middle East Conference 
but every reason to support it. Although 
there is no speciﬁ c information available 
about the country’s ofﬁ cial position on the 
MEC, Tunisia can be expected to follow 
rather than take a leading position in the 
Arab World. Finally, it is likely to support 
the Middle East Conference, based on its 
well-documented opposition to weapons 
of mass destruction.
Egypt: Transition to ‘Civilian’ Control?
Although the Arab Spring uprisings began 
in Tunisia, Egypt (and Tahrir Square in 
particular) has become the symbol of these 
events. Three factors contributed to the 
protests which began in January 2011.9 First, 
the authoritarian rule of the Mubarak regime 
allowed only limited political freedoms 
and moved harshly to crush overt expres-
sions of opposition. Second, a dramatic 
change in demographics occurred: since the 
1950s, Egypt’s population has quadrupled, 
increasing from 21 to more than 83 
million people. This resulted in growing 
unemployment especially among the middle 
class youth, deteriorating health and educa-
tional services, and imbalances in the existing 
social structures. Third, the fact that after 
two decades of neoliberal economic reforms 
the Egyptian state was unable to guarantee 
the population a basic standard of living, 
called its legitimacy into question.10
In addition, there were a number of 
more proximate causes for the uprisings. 
Mubarak’s efforts to appoint his son 
Gamal as his successor were considered an 
affront by many to Egypt’s national dignity. 
The parliamentary elections in November 
2010 were allegedly rigged and virtually 
eliminated the opposition.11 Furthermore, a 
wide popular protest movement that was 
often violently crushed by the security forces 
had already been active since 2004.12 These 
and relations with other Arab countries 
remain priorities. However, a more active 
policy is expected with regard to neigh-
boring countries to counter possible 
spillover effects from instability in Libya, 
including arms trafﬁ cking and threats to 
a very fragile Tunisian economic recovery. 
The ‘troika’ also agrees that Tunisia would 
beneﬁ t from a diversiﬁ ed foreign policy, 
fostering stronger relations with emerging 
economies such as Brazil, China, and India. 
Another novelty in Tunisian foreign policy, 
based on ideological similarities, is Tunis’ 
growing links with Turkey and Qatar, 
which have been extending their inﬂ uence 
throughout the region.
Tunisia’s foreign policy has been subject to 
a change of principles and tone rather than 
to a radical shift of geographic priorities or 
regional alliances. The government’s main 
goal in a democratic foreign policy is to 
defend Tunisia’s national interests rather 
than its own narrow ones. The Salaﬁ s, 
who were not allowed to run for the 
elections, could use foreign policy issues, 
particularly the Arab-Israeli conﬂ ict, for 
their own political gain in an attempt to 
erode conﬁ dence in the government and 
undermine Ennahda’s credibility. The 
rhetoric against Israel is likely to be much 
harsher than that of previous Tunisian 
governments. Indeed, there is a consensus 
that links normalization of relations with 
Israel to the recognition of the Palestinian 
state, which is generally characteristic of 
all Arab countries based on the Arab Peace 
Initiative, but especially true for those in 
transition. However, the new institutions 
have made great efforts to differentiate the 
critical stance towards Israeli policies from 
those regarding the Jewish population of 
Tunisia. Particularly the interim president 
emphasized in meetings with Jewish 
community leaders and in public speeches 
that the Jewish population is an integral 
part of the Tunisian people.
Tunisia’s role in Middle East affairs was 
especially prominent at the end of the 
1980s and beginning of 1990s, when it 
hosted the headquarters of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization. With regards to 
arms control, the country is a party to all 
major multilateral disarmament treaties: 
the NPT, the BTWC, the CWC, and 
the CTBT. Tunisia has the Additional 
Protocol to its safeguards agreement with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in force and is a party to the 
Pelindaba Treaty on the African nuclear 
weapon free zone. Furthermore, the 
»Tunisia has no reason to 
oppose the upcoming Middle 
East Conference but every 
reason to support it.«
5The Arab Spring
Its Impact on the Region and on the Middle East Conference
opposition movements gathered adherents 
using the Internet’s social media networks. 
Given the tight control of the press and 
TV, this new technology allowed a younger 
generation to operate relatively freely in a 
new virtual reality. Finally, mass demon-
strations in Tunisia served as the catalyst 
for a disparate crowd of labor groups, 
urban youths, mosques, professionals, and 
the Muslim Brotherhood to take to the 
streets. Mubarak was slow to react to the 
protests and was unwilling to use violence 
to crush the riots, resulting in his ousting 
on February 11, 2011.
Soon thereafter, a committee was estab-
lished to draft a provisional constitution, 
which was accepted by 77 percent in 
a public referendum in March 2012. 
In the parliamentary elections held in 
November 2011 and January 2012, the 
Muslim Brotherhood received 47 percent 
and the Salaﬁ st Al-Nour 24 percent of 
the vote. Presidential elections were 
held in May/June 2012 and the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s candidate, Mohamed Morsi, 
won the second round of voting against 
the former Prime Minister Ahmad Shaﬁ q. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Council of 
Armed Forces (SCAF) still holds consid-
erable power and Parliament was dissolved 
in June 2012 by the High Constitutional 
Court. The SCAF issued a constitutional 
declaration that upholds its legislative 
powers, its control over the budget, and 
its right to appoint the committee to 
write the new Egyptian constitution. In 
an unexpected move, however, President 
Morsi deﬁ ed the SCAF’s order and recon-
vened the Parliament.13 However, he had to 
back off after a second ruling of the High 
Constitutional Court which insisted that 
the results of the elections were illegal – 
but the ‘battle’ is far from over.
A new balance of power is emerging in 
Egypt among the army, which is keen 
to preserve its security and economic 
interests; the Islamists (mainly the Muslim 
Brotherhood); and the more liberal-secular 
youth. This is a precarious balance, with 
each group pursuing disparate aims and 
cultivating different modes of operation. 
Furthermore, the country is stuck in a 
struggle between two schools of thoughts: 
those preferring a religious state (dawla 
diniyya) and those aspiring to a civil state 
(dawla madaniyya). The economy may prove 
one of the greatest political challenges. 
High unemployment could provide a fertile 
breeding ground for political violence. 
Sectarian conﬂ icts between Muslims and 
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Another important pillar of Cairo’s foreign 
policy is its peace treaty with Israel. This 
accord has been domestically contro-
versial since its conclusion in 1979. The 
attack on the Israeli embassy in Cairo in 
September 2011 increased instability in the 
Sinai and at the Egyptian-Israeli border, 
and the termination of the gas supply to 
Israel in April 2012 illustrate why bilateral 
relations have reached their lowest level 
since 1979. Nevertheless, the Egyptian 
military and President Morsi have so far 
declared that the peace treaty with Israel will 
not be rescinded. In any event, it is unlikely 
that the accord would be abolished, though 
it may be revised upon proposals coming 
from Egypt or re-negotiated. The fact that 
Islamic political groups in Egypt (including 
the Salaﬁ s) do not categorically disavow 
the treaty may indicate a subtle change in 
policy. In general, Egypt’s foreign policy 
will develop more in line with its domestic 
aspirations and increasingly reﬂ ect popular 
sentiments. The strong links between the 
Egyptian elite, the United States, and Israel 
were deeply unpopular amongst the general 
public. It remains an open question how 
American-Egyptian relations will develop 
in the coming years.
Over the last decades, Egypt has been the 
leading country in pushing for the elimi-
nation of nuclear and other weapons of 
mass destruction in the Middle East as its 
dominant role in the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference clearly illustrates. However, 
Egypt’s own history with respect to WMD 
is mixed. It used chemical weapons in the 
1960s in the Yemeni civil war and is still 
believed to possess them. Egypt is a party 
to the NPT; it has signed but not ratiﬁ ed 
the CTBT, the Pelindaba Treaty (African 
NWFZ) and the BTWC, and remains 
outside both the Additional Protocol and 
the CWC. Its position is that unless Israel 
becomes a party to the NPT, Egypt is not 
willing to take on any further disarmament 
commitments. While on some occasions 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood have 
pointed to the deterrence beneﬁ ts of nuclear 
weapons, it is unlikely that these comments 
suggest a radical change in Egypt’s choices 
with respect to nuclear weapons.14
Overall, Egypt’s arms control commitment 
and its readiness to play a leading role 
at the Middle East Conference seems 
to be still in place. Even after the fall of 
Mubarak, Egypt spared no effort to clarify 
its undiminished interest in a regional 
WMD/DVs Free Zone. As its representative 
stated at the Preparatory Committee of 
Coptic Orthodox Christians have come 
out in the open due to the increasing insta-
bility, and among Muslims the Sunni-Shia 
animosity is heating up. Since democracy 
means majority rule, respecting the rights 
of these minorities will be an important 
test for the new Egyptian government.
After the dissolution and reconvening 
of Parliament, the ‘divorce’ between 
the military and the Islamists is in plain 
sight since neither the military nor the 
Islamists are prepared to cede power. 
Tensions could increase especially after 
the unexpected move by President Morsi 
to send Minister of Defense, Hussein 
Tantawi, and Chief of Staff, Sami Anan, 
into retirement. Even though it was short-
lived, the Parliament illustrated the difﬁ -
culties Islamists had in power, both with 
regard to domestic and foreign policy, 
as well as the disillusionment of a large 
segment of the population.
The era of President Nasser’s charismatic 
leadership is past, but a newly emerging 
Egypt can once more become a model for 
Arab states. However, it remains unclear 
what elements will drive the country’s 
foreign policy. Islam will certainly play a 
dominant role, but addressing the country’s 
economic challenges and improving the 
population’s standard of living will be 
the main priority for the government. 
In spite of the change of leadership, no 
fundamental changes are to be expected 
in Egypt’s foreign policy, although 
some modiﬁ cations may take place. The 
Arab-Israeli conﬂ ict is likely to remain its 
primary foreign policy concern.
Prior to the Arab Spring uprisings, Cairo 
supported some Israeli policies in the 
region, including the blockade of Gaza. 
Such policies generated a sense of distance 
between the regime and the people. Under 
the new government, these policies have 
already come under revision. The current 
leadership has shown greater openness 
towards Hamas than the Mubarak regime 
and has promised to provide defense to 
the Palestinians and economic aid in the 
event of Israeli military operations in the 
Gaza Strip. Whereas the Mubarak regime 
was seen as partial towards Fatah, the new 
government has taken a more balanced 
approach towards the two Palestinian 
factions and was ﬁ nally able to broker 
a reconciliation between Hamas and 
Fatah (see POLICY BRIEF No. 3 by Margret 
Johannsen et al. and POLICY BRIEF No. 4 by 
István Balogh et al.).
»Even after the fall of Mubarak, 
Egypt spared no effort to 
clarify its undiminished interest 
in a regional WMD/DVs Free 
Zone.«
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the NPT Review Conference in May 2012, 
“Egypt has conducted and continues to 
conduct consultations with various parties in 
this regard, bilaterally, regionally and multi-
laterally, including within the framework of 
the League of Arab States.”15 Cairo has been 
active in promoting the participation of all 
Arab countries in the MEC and in drafting 
a common Arab League position.
Libya: ‘Surprise’ Transition
The Libyan uprising, in spite of the many 
indications of dire social conditions and 
resentment against the dictatorial regime, 
was unique even in Arab Spring terms. First, 
no one expected that Muammar Gaddaﬁ ’s 
42-year rule could be challenged. Second, 
it was the ﬁ rst in a series of Arab Spring 
uprisings in which a dictator fought back. 
Third, it was the only Arab Spring event in 
which the international community inter-
vened militarily, and the ﬁ rst case in which 
the Arab League appeared as a visible actor 
supporting such outside intervention. Fourth, 
the uprisings led to a full-scale civil war that 
ended with the violent death of the former 
dictator. Libya announced its liberation 
by the National Transitional Council in 
October 2011, which has since been running 
the country through its executive committee. 
Elections for a national assembly which will 
be charged with the task of drafting a consti-
tution were postponed from June 19, but were 
ﬁ nally held on July 7, 2012. In contrast to 
the election results in other Arab countries, 
the Islamists were beaten by the Liberals. 
The centrist National Forces Alliance led by 
Mahmoud Jibril won more than double (41) 
the seats of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice 
and Constitution Party (17).16 In addition, 
90 percent of the women’s vote went to the 
liberal parties. However, the political scene 
is far from settled: the Islamist parties are 
expected to unite forces and challenge the 
liberals by presenting them as a threat to the 
future of Islam in Libya.
The Libyan transformation has been a 
relatively smooth political process, but it 
still reﬂ ects a redistribution of power along 
more traditional patrimonial lines rather 
than a move towards democratization in 
the European sense. This is reﬂ ected in 
a number of unresolved issues: Islamists 
vs. Liberals, former regime members vs. 
rebels, the Political Separation Law, Saif 
Al-Islam Gaddaﬁ ’s trial, and most of all the 
security problems including armed militias, 
organized crime, and the threat of tribal 
clashes. While the regime change was widely 
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considered to be the direct result of the 
NATO intervention, by now it has become 
clear that instead of democracy, a new 
neo-patrimonial system is in the making, 
and no genuinely new political force has 
emerged. At the same time, most observers 
were surprised to see that the elections went 
smoothly despite tribal divisions and that 
the secularists have ﬁ nally won.
It remains to be seen what impact the 
political transformation is going to have 
on Libyan foreign relations aside from 
the fact that they will most likely be less 
provocative and less sensational. In the 
short term, Libya may probably engage 
in domestic security rather than issues of 
foreign security and consequently will not 
be in a position to pursue a very active 
foreign policy.
Although the traditional spheres of Libya’s 
foreign policy (Arab, African, Islamic) will 
remain the same, Tripoli could play a more 
visible role in the Maghreb, and in speciﬁ c 
cases sub-Saharan Africa could be a sphere 
of inﬂ uence rather than interference. Libya 
projects threats in different directions: the 
EU feels challenged by migration from 
sub-Sahara and Libya’s neighbors are 
concerned about the spillover of armed 
clashes and illegal arms ﬂ ows. 
Libya still may have an overall external 
impact, namely the lessons that some 
regimes may draw from the fate of the 
Gaddaﬁ  regime: they may, for example, 
conclude that Gaddafi was weakened 
by giving up the WMD programs and 
was forced out of power. Despite past 
clandestine efforts to acquire nuclear 
and biological weapons, Libya’s WMD 
threat was primarily its chemical weapon 
program conducted at three research, devel-
opment, and production facilities at Rabta, 
Tarhuna, and Sebha. Libya is one of the 
few countries that has deployed chemical 
weapons in a conﬂ ict, namely against its 
southern neighbor Chad in 1987.
In the aftermath of the civil war, Tripoli 
has neither the political will nor the funds 
to engage in WMD activities in the short 
or medium term. While the Gaddaﬁ 
regime did pursue WMD programs (mostly 
chemical weapons), Libya signed and 
ratiﬁ ed all relevant international WMD 
treaties, following its renunciation of all 
kinds of weapons of mass destruction 
in December 2003. Today, the country 
is party to the NPT, the CTBT, and the 
Pelindaba Treaty. It has also signed the 
Additional Protocol to its safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA. Furthermore, 
the country is party to the BTWC and 
the CWC. However, Libya had previously 
signaled to the OPCW – the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons – 
that it would not be able to eliminate all its 
stockpiles by April 2012.
Nevertheless, since Libya is not a primary 
actor in WMD-related hard security issues, 
it will be at best a nominal supporter of the 
relevant arms control negotiations. Libya is 
unique among the countries involved with 
respect to the proliferation of small arms and 
light weapons, the collection and disposal 
of which is one of the biggest security tasks 
and concerns of the new government both 
domestically and regionally. Reportedly, 
20,000 surface-to-air missiles are missing 
from army weapon warehouses, some of 
which have reappeared already in the Gaza 
Strip.17
Whether the new Libyan leadership will 
participate in the MEC is yet to be seen. 
However, it is likely that the government 
will play a supportive role in the process 
due to the debt the National Transitional 
Council owes the UN, the Arab League, 
and the African Union for their acknowl-
edgment and support, as well as the role 
of the global great powers, all of whom 
support the idea of a Middle East WMD 
Free Zone. Furthermore, Libya is already 
part of a nuclear weapon free zone 
(Pelindaba Treaty). Tripoli’s support of the 
Arab position, especially if framed in Arab 
League terms, could prove not only to be 
a conﬁ dence-building measure, but could 
also become a symbol of Libya’s reinte-
gration into the Arab fold.
Countries of Instability: 
Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain
Yemen: Negotiated Transition
In January 2011, Yemen’s youth reacted to 
the events in Tunisia and Egypt by demon-
strations which soon spread to important 
Yemeni cities. Protesters initially opposed 
governmental plans to modify the 
country’s constitution. They also opposed 
high unemployment, poor economic 
conditions, and widespread corruption. 
However, the demands soon included a 
call for the removal of long-time President 
Ali Abdullah Saleh who responded with a 
mix of political maneuvering: patronage 
and bribery, co-option, repression, and 
propaganda.18 In a notorious incident, 
»Tripoli’s support of the 
Arab position, especially if 
framed in Arab League terms, 
could prove not only to be a 
conﬁ dence-building measure, 
but could also become a 
symbol of Libya’s reintegration 
into the Arab fold.«
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snipers shot and killed dozens of unarmed 
civilians on March 28, 2011, declared as 
the ‘dignity day’. In the face of this brutal 
repression, the initially youth-dominated 
movement expanded into a mass uprising. 
Furthermore, the support for the protests 
declared by a key ﬁ gure of the regime, 
Major General Ali Muhsin Al-Ahmar, 
opened the way to mass defections by half 
of the army, most of the government’s 
civil servants, and prominent politi-
cians. Therefore, the uprising gained un-
precedented momentum, but at the same 
time it became dominated by the defected 
ﬁ gures, who favored a mediated resolution 
to the conﬂ ict.
The mediation proposal of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, which included 
immunity for Saleh and his family 
members, initially received broad support 
from opposition groups. But after the 
government resorted to massive violence 
against protesters, large segments of the 
opposition rejected the deal and demanded 
Saleh to be charged with the deadly 
shootings. An attack on the presidential 
compound in Sana’a on June 3, 2011, 
injured Saleh who was evacuated to Saudi 
Arabia for medical treatment, but remained 
unwilling to resign. During his absence, Vice 
President Abdal-Rabah Mansour Al-Hadi 
took over as acting president. Finally, Saleh 
signed the GCC initiative and Al-Hadi was 
elected as the new President of Yemen on 
February 21, 2012. Steps towards further 
political transformation are planned for 
the near future, including a comprehensive 
national dialogue conference, a reform 
of the constitution, reorganization of the 
military and security services, and ﬁ nally 
presidential and parliamentary elections 
by 2014.
However, the ongoing violence between 
heavily armed factions transformed a 
peaceful youth movement into an elite power 
struggle among Yemen’s key powerbrokers: 
the military, the tribes, and the Islamists. 
Since the ‘new’ regime is still dominated 
by former power holders, the protesters are 
frustrated that their movement has been 
co-opted by elites who operate according 
to highly personal ‘rules’ outside the scope 
of Yemen’s weak formal institutions.19 
It is unclear whether Yemen’s transition 
will proceed or the country will descend 
even further into instability. However, the 
weakness of state institutions, the division 
of the security apparatus resulting from 
defections during the protests, and the fact 
that only some opposition groups signed the 
GCC deal, could well undermine the ability 
of Saleh’s successor to establish stability and 
preserve political unity (see POLICY BRIEF 
No. 7 by Lars Berger et al.).
Yemeni foreign policy in the post-Saleh 
period is not yet well deﬁ ned, although it 
will most likely continue to reﬂ ect Saudi 
positions, given the crucial importance of 
the country’s relations with Riyadh. Yet, 
the Yemeni foreign policy will continue 
to strive for membership of the GCC and 
its partnership within the international 
coalition to combat terrorism. With regard 
to disarmament, Yemen has traditionally 
stressed the need for a Middle East region 
free of nuclear and other weapons of mass 
destruction. This view was emphasized 
during the meeting of Yemeni Foreign 
Minister Abu Bakr Al-Qirbi and the 
non-resident ambassador of Finland to 
Yemen, Jarno Syrjälä, in preparation for 
the Middle East Conference.20 
Nevertheless, in a geographical and 
political sense, Yemen is far from being 
a central actor in the envisioned Middle 
East Conference. However, its political 
future could easily shape the initiative on 
several levels: Yemen might store chemical 
weapons and has imported various 
WMD-capable aircraft and missiles; the 
country is one of the region’s preeminent 
weapon markets with the potential to 
serve as a major gateway for illicit conven-
tional and unconventional weapons; in the 
ongoing tensions between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, Yemen could play an increasingly 
prominent role; and the country’s insta-
bility provides a basis for Al-Qaeda in the 
Arab Peninsula, posing a direct threat to 
the vicinity and to the larger Western world 
(see POLICY BRIEF No. 7 by Lars Berger et 
al.). In 2011, turmoil in Yemen produced 
a political vacuum. Accordingly, Al-Qaeda 
tried to ﬁ ll this void in some areas. The 
Yemeni army, however, was able to hit at 
the organization’s stronghold in the ﬁ rst 
half of 2012.
Yemen is a party to the NPT, the BTWC, 
and the CWC as well as a signatory to 
the CTBT. In the context of the Middle 
East Conference, the Yemeni government 
would need to ensure that any existing 
stockpiles of chemical weapons within 
the country are secure and that a strategy 
to destroy all existing material covered 
by the BTWC and CWC is developed. 
Such a strategy should also cover the non-
proliferation of dual-use chemical and 
bilogical technologies in order to avoid any 
»The ongoing violence be-
tween heavily armed factions 
transformed a peaceful youth 
movement into an elite power 
struggle among Yemen’s key 
powerbrokers: the military, the 
tribes, and the Islamists.«
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access by terrorists. Yemen’s compliance 
would be facilitated if other countries such 
as Israel and Egypt were willing to sign 
and/or ratify both conventions.
Bahrain: Suppressed Transition
Inspired by the popular uprisings in Tunisia 
and Egypt, mass protest began in Bahrain in 
February 2011, calling for greater political 
freedom and equality for all Bahrainis. 
Although the ruling monarchy in the 
small Gulf state has witnessed popular 
opposition for decades, the local Arab 
Spring events constituted an unprecedented 
wave of protests across the country.21 
Socio-economic discontent, a high level 
of unemployment, especially among the 
youth, discrimination against the Shia 
majority, the slow pace of democratization,
and popular anger at perceived corruption 
have brought tens of thousands of mostly 
young Bahrainis to camp in the center of 
Manama. The panicked reaction of the 
Al-Khalifa regime resulted in a brutal 
response, as government forces opened ﬁ re 
on sleeping demonstrators in the middle of 
the night.22 Immediately thereafter, armed 
soldiers, tanks, and military checkpoints 
were deployed in the streets of the capital.23 
As a response, 200,000 people (one in 
six of all Bahraini citizens) participated 
in a peaceful pro-democracy march on 
February 25, 2011.
On March 14, the GCC deployed its 
‘Peninsula Shield Force’ to Bahrain, 
including 1,000 Saudi Arabian troops and 
about 500 police ofﬁ cers from the United 
Arab Emirates. King Hamad declared a 
state of emergency, followed by a crackdown 
of the oppositional movement in which the 
Bahraini government pursued all forms of 
dissent.24 Allegedly, 85 persons were killed 
in the protests, and hundreds wounded; 
nearly 3,000 people were detained during 
the 2011 protest movement. 
In June 2011, Bahraini King Hamad set up 
an (ostensibly) independent commission 
to investigate the events of February and 
March. Its chairman, Mahmoud Cherif 
Bassiouni, concluded in a televised speech in 
the presence of the King that the authorities 
had used excessive force during its crackdown 
on protesters. In addition, the commis-
sion’s report found that many detainees 
were subjected to torture and other forms 
of physical and psychological abuse while in 
custody.25 In response to the protests, the 
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King also convened the National Dialogue 
in July 2011, an initiative to promote reform 
and encourage discussion on the governance 
of Bahrain. But the transformation process 
was completely in the hands of the ruling 
elite. The opposition agreed to this initiative 
since Saudi Arabia, as proven by its military 
intervention, was unwilling to allow a fellow 
ruling family in the Gulf to fall from power. 
The Al-Wefaq, the largest opposition group, 
was designated only ﬁ ve seats out of 300 
in the National Dialogue and therefore 
withdrew from the forum, questioning the 
regime’s commitment to reform. Since then 
Bahrain’s policies have swung “between 
reform and repression” leaving the roots of 
Bahrain’s political and economic inequal-
ities unaddressed and thereby empowering 
radical voices across the political spectrum.26 
On March 9, 2012, hundreds of thousands 
again protested in one of the biggest anti-
government rallies to date.
In spite of these internal political upheavals, 
Bahraini foreign policies have not changed 
dramatically. The kingdom usually takes 
positions in line with the GCC, especially 
with Saudi Arabia, and the Arab League. 
Furthermore, it promotes the use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes. It enjoys a 
close relationship to the United States as 
major non-NATO ally. Manama hosts the 
headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet and 
beneﬁ ts from one of the strongest missile 
defense umbrellas anywhere in the world.27 
However, Bahrainis look with concern 
to the nuclear potential and the missiles 
of Iran. The government has repeatedly 
accused Tehran of meddling in its domestic 
affairs. 
With an eye on the Islamic Republic, the 
GCC states have endorsed the initiative 
to declare a Gulf WMD Free Zone. In 
addition to including its member countries, 
the plan calls for an incremental integration 
of the other three Gulf states, Iran, Iraq, 
and Yemen, and ﬁ nally the entire Middle 
East, including Israel. Representatives of 
Bahrain have consistently supported the 
call for the Middle East Conference on the 
establishment of a WMD/DVs Free Zone, 
including nuclear weapons.28 In combi-
nation with the possible strategic challenge 
arising from Iran’s nuclear program, there 
is increasing interest in nuclear politics in 
Bahrain. The kingdom is a party to the 
NPT, the BTWC, the CWC, and the CTBT. 
It has signed the Additional Protocol to its 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA and 
ratiﬁ ed it in 2011. It can be assumed that 
without game-changing developments in 
Bahrain, which are unlikely from today’s 
perspective, the country will participate in 
the Middle East Conference. 
Syria: Bloody Transition 
with No Clear Prospects
After the authoritarian regimes in Tunisia 
and Egypt had already been toppled, 
the Syrian town of Deraa witnessed an 
uprising in March 2011. While protesters 
initially claimed reforms, demands rapidly 
escalated into a call for the resignation of 
President Bashar Al-Assad. Resentment 
against his rule had been on the rise as 
complaints about the power position 
of the Alawi sect and dissatisfaction 
with the country’s economic situation 
had mounted. The increasingly violent 
response of the Syrian Army, deployed 
by the president to suppress the initially 
peaceful protests, fuelled the anger. Assad 
blamed “criminal armed gangs, intent 
on stirring up sectarian divisions within 
Syria’s heterogeneous population” for the 
violence.29 At the same time, he also intro-
duced some reforms, ending a 48-year long 
state of emergency and offering a consti-
tution that allowed parties other than the 
ruling Ba’ath to run for elections, as well 
as limiting presidential rule to two terms. 
These modest reforms were greeted with 
widespread skepticism. 
The opposition mobilized by creating 
various factions, including the Syrian 
National Council and the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA) to respond with force to the regime’s 
army, which inﬂ icted over 9,000 deaths 
during the ﬁ rst year of the uprising. The 
overarching goal of the opposition forces 
is to remove Assad from power. Violence 
spread to the disenfranchized areas of 
the country – infamously to the towns of 
Homs and Hama, among others – while the 
capitol of Damascus and the city of Aleppo 
remained relatively peaceful until July 2012. 
Afterwards, both cities were massively 
affected forcing hundreds of thousands to 
ﬂ ee. What had started as a quite moderate 
attempt to introduce political freedoms 
to the country, soon turned into a bloody 
internal confrontation. In July 2012, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
declared the internal ﬁ ghting in Syria a 
civil war.30
The international reaction to the Syrian 
crisis has been mixed. In contrast to the 
Libyan case, armed intervention has not 
had many supporters. The League of Arab 
States suspended Damascus’ membership 
»It can be assumed that 
without game-changing devel-
opments in Bahrain, which 
are unlikely from today’s 
perspective, the country will 
participate in the Middle East 
Conference.«
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in November 2011 and then focused its 
efforts on mediating a solution by sending 
international monitors. The Arab League 
also tried to introduce a UN Security Council 
resolution, which was vetoed by Russia 
and China. Former UN Secretary General, 
Koﬁ  Annan, was subsequently appointed 
as Special Envoy and, in March 2012, he 
was able to convey a six-point peace plan 
acceptable to both the government and the 
Free Syrian Army. However, the ceaseﬁ re 
crumbled as a consequence of increased 
repression. After the resignation of Koﬁ 
Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed as 
the joint UN-Arab League Special Envoy 
in August 2012.
While the humanitarian situation keeps 
getting worse, the international community 
remains divided about what path to take. 
On the one hand, the EU and the U.S. 
have imposed sanctions on the regime 
and called for Assad to resign. On the 
other hand, Russia and China continue 
to support the regime and have blocked 
all efforts in the UN Security Council to 
sanction Syria, in line with their refusal 
to interfere in the internal affairs of other 
states. Moscow attaches special importance 
to the survival of the present government 
given that Syria hosts its only naval base 
in the Mediterranean and is an important 
market for Russian arms. 
In the region, Syria has few supporters: Iran 
and the Lebanese Hezbollah remain close to 
President Assad and Tehran even provided, 
in addition to military aid, economic 
support to ease the impact of sanctions. 
By contrast, Saudi Arabia and Qatar spoke 
in favor of arming the opposition in order 
to increase its chances of success. Turkey 
initially reacted with caution but then grew 
weary of the violence in its own backyard 
that was leading scores of refugees to ﬂ ee 
into the Anatolian peninsula. The incident 
involving the Turkish ﬁ ghter jet brought 
down by Syria’s air defense demonstrated 
that, despite its rhetoric, Ankara has so 
far shown little intention of getting 
involved militarily with its southern 
neighbor.
The situation in Syria is in continuous 
f lux, with the opposition forces 
sometimes hitting important targets (e.g. 
the Damascus bombing of July 20, 2012) 
and the regime reacting with increased 
violence. From today’s perspective, an 
international intervention on the Libyan 
model can be ruled out and it is doubtful 
that any Western power will be willing to 
intervene in the absence of a UN mandate. 
At the same time, the regime’s willingness 
to remain in power is undiminished as 
is the determination of the FSA. What 
seems likely is that a continuation of the 
present conﬂ ict will result in a long-lasting 
civil war. The joint mediatory efforts 
of the UN and the Arab League could 
offer a way of scaling down the conﬂ ict. 
However, their mission might well be seen 
as “a way to drag the process on and shift 
the focus from regime change to regime 
concessions.”31
What does this mean for the participation 
of Syria to the Middle East Conference in 
December 2012? It is clear that the Syrian 
government is primarily concerned with 
ongoing domestic violence and that little 
effort will be expended on questions of 
arms control. Moreover, Syria will likely 
be on the agenda of the conference. The 
country’s WMD record, in fact, is far 
from clean: while a member of the NPT 
with IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards 
in force, Syria has not ratiﬁ ed the BTWC 
and not even signed the CWC. More 
importantly, the country is suspected of 
having a chemical arsenal whose future 
remains increasingly uncertain in the 
current conﬂ ict. The Syrian government 
at some point threatened to use these 
should Syria be attacked from the outside. 
Yet, it ordered the facilities be put under 
strengthened guard against possible conﬁ s-
cation by the opposition forces. In parallel, 
fears have been raised that these agents 
could be used by the regime against the 
protesters or get lost in the resulting chaos. 
These chemical capabilities, together with 
its arsenal of mostly short-range Scud 
missiles, are considered a deterrent against 
Israel’s nuclear arsenal. Tensions among 
the two are an old issue, dating back to the 
Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights. 
The WMD component of this rivalry was 
heightened in 2007, when an Israeli air 
strike destroyed an undeclared supposedly 
nuclear facility in Syria.
If the MEC can manage to negotiate recip-
rocal arms reduction, linking negotiations 
on Syria’s chemical and Israel’s nuclear 
weapons could turn out to be quite useful. 
Veriﬁ ed reductions by one could lead 
to similar steps by the other, effectively 
demonstrating that both Israel and Syria 
could gain by limiting their armaments. At 
the moment, Syria is certainly not interested 
in this prospect, but it has traditionally 
supported the idea of establishing a WMD 
Free Zone in the Middle East.
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Transformations within 
the Regime: Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan
Saudi Arabia: Cautious 
Top-Down Transformation
The Arab Spring events are seen in the 
states of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 
general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, with 
a mixture of trepidation and skepticism on 
the one hand, and hope on the other. The 
ruling monarchies dislike the uncertainty 
associated with a change in the status quo 
and there is a distinct worry that without 
strict vigilance and control, similar scenes 
could emerge in their own countries. 
Meanwhile, the population in the Gulf has 
been inspired by the action of their fellow 
Arabs and as a result there is a certain 
degree of hope that the ruling families will 
now begin the process of implementing 
some political and social reform.
For the moment Saudi rulers are still in 
ﬁ rm control, although in the long run 
a slow transition towards constitutional 
monarchy is discernible. The ruling 
family has maintained its legitimacy and 
popularity: not only have they provided 
stability to their societies, but they have 
also steadily increased the welfare of their 
people through unprecedented economic 
and social development. A cautious social 
reform program, mostly connected with 
King Abdullah, has been on the agenda 
even prior to the start of the Arab Spring, 
in spite of more conservative forces within 
the ruling family. However, the death of 
Crown Prince Nayef in June 2012, who 
had usually been portrayed as the conserv-
ative counterbalance to the ‘reformer’ 
King Abdullah, has brought the issue 
of succession to the fore and has raised 
serious questions about the future of the 
monarchy.
It has not been Saudi Arabia’s own 
transformation, but that of other states, 
especially in its direct proximity (Bahrain, 
Yemen), that has had an impact on Saudi 
external relations. On the one hand, an 
armed conﬂ ict would not only threaten 
the domestic security and economic 
output of Saudi Arabia, but could also 
upset the precarious balance within the 
GCC at a stage when (further) integration 
is envisioned. On the other hand, both 
Bahrain and Yemen have become the 
scenes of a proxy conﬂ ict between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran, with the latter supporting 
the Shia population against the Sunni 
rulers in Bahrain and challenging the Saudi 
authority and leadership in the Gulf. The 
ambition of the Iranian leaders to establish 
the Islamic Republic as a major regional 
power, illustrated by its program to acquire 
nuclear capabilities and its willingness to 
meddle in the affairs of other countries, 
has led Saudi Arabia – in spite of its usual 
cautiousness – to act openly to stabilize 
neighboring countries. Yet, the Saudi/
UAE military intervention in Bahrain has 
raised concerns not only in the Gulf, but in 
the wider Arab region as well.
Saudi Arabia is a policy maker in the region 
and although it does not like to act overtly, 
it considers itself a leading political actor in 
Arab and Gulf affairs. In the past decade or 
so, it has undertaken several initiatives to 
resolve inter-Arab issues. In this capacity it 
has recently been challenged by an increas-
ingly active Qatari foreign policy. Saudi 
Arabia has no open relationship with Israel, 
but its concern over Iranian ambitions 
partially coincides with Israeli threat 
perceptions. Yet, without peace between 
Israel and the Palestinians, the Saudis will 
not publicly take up common cause with 
Israel. In 2002 it was Saudi Arabia, which, 
in the name of all Arab countries, put 
forward the Arab Peace Initiative. It offers 
Arab recognition and diplomatic relations 
in return for an Israeli withdrawal to the 
1967 lines. Although the peace plan has not 
been implemented, Saudi rulers take credit 
for putting it forward and keeping the 
proposal, ofﬁ cially at least, on the table.32
Due to its geographic position, Saudi 
Arabia is much more concerned with the 
developing Iranian nuclear program than 
with Israel’s established nuclear arsenal. In a 
move ofﬁ cially designed to counterbalance 
potential Iranian nuclear capabilities, the 
kingdom has also announced it will start a 
civilian nuclear program, which many fear 
could serve as a basis for a future nuclear 
arms race, should Iran develop nuclear 
weapons. For the time being, however, 
Saudi Arabia is a party to the NPT, the 
BTWC, and the CWC, but has not signed 
the CTBT, and while it has a full-scope 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA, it 
has yet to sign the Additional Protocol. 
Because of its leading role in the Islamic 
world, its responsibility for the Palestinians 
on the one hand, and its threat perception 
of Iranian hegemonic policies and the 
nuclear program on the other, Saudi 
Arabia will most certainly be one of the 
»As much as the Saudis do 
not like the spotlight, they have 
little choice: if they do not take 
a leading role, others will act 
and the Saudis will have to 
follow.«
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arbitrators of an Arab League common 
position on arms control if there is one. 
However, given its preference for keeping 
a low-key proﬁ le, it could leave the presen-
tation of that position and the leadership 
at the MEC to Egypt. Yet, as much as the 
Saudis do not like the spotlight, they have 
little choice: if they do not take a leading 
role, others will act and the Saudis will 
have to follow.
Jordan: Efforts at 
Top-Down Transformation
Jordan has been profoundly inﬂ uenced 
by the Arab Spring and is undergoing 
a semi-transitional period of political 
changes, a top-down reform process, in 
which many Jordanians are reluctant to 
challenge the legitimacy of the Hashemite 
monarchy despite an unprecedented 
willingness to criticize King Abdullah II. 
Starting at the beginning of 2011, Jordan 
experienced protests mainly focused 
on the poor economic conditions and 
demands for political reforms. Yet, Prime 
Minister Samir Al-Rifai, rather than the 
whole monarchical establishment, was 
blamed for the country’s tax policy. King 
Abdullah II was therefore able to assuage 
the protesters by installing three different 
prime ministers in 18 months and by 
introducing some limited reforms.33 
Although the situation is not comparable 
to Egypt or Tunisia, the extent of reforms 
was unprecedented in Jordanian history. 
Particularly important was the fact that 
the protests were also joined by parts of 
the society traditionally rather loyal to the 
Palace. Nonetheless, not even the Muslim 
Brotherhood challenged the existence of 
the monarchy but instead limited itself to 
asking for greater representation.
The most serious dilemma facing the 
Jordanian community today is posed by the 
trend towards ‘political culture extremism’ 
based on misperceived loyalty and conﬂ icts 
of identity. Tribalism for instance, is a 
threat to maintaining and preserving 
domestic stability. Yet, the emergence of 
young technocrats within the tribes may 
introduce a pattern of modernization and 
challenge the existing political order (‘new 
tribalism’). 
The cornerstone of popular demands 
for domestic reform consists of ﬁ ghting 
corruption and hastening legislative 
reforms such as new election laws. 
Neither the Palestinian-Israeli conﬂ ict 
nor weapons of mass destruction are 
signiﬁ cant issues for the majority of 
Jordanians today, despite the fact that the 
developments in the Arab-Israeli conﬂ ict 
have an effect on the country’s internal 
cohesion and stability. The conﬂ ict 
can be seen as a unifying factor among 
the different segments of society 
and contributes to reducing internal 
violence. This poses a serious dilemma 
for the government, especially after the 
current impasse in the peace process. 
Friction between the government’s foreign 
policy vis-à-vis Israel and public opinion 
has been growing, yet the 1994 peace 
treaty has not thereby been threatened.
Box No. 2: The Arab League in Times of Transformation
If past experience is any indication, Arab countries tend to pursue a common position 
in arms control initiatives. The forum where the joint Arab position is likely to be formed 
is the Arab League, which established the Arab Committee on Drafting a Treaty on the 
Establishment of a Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction as the responsible unit.i 
Consequently, if there is a common decision to participate in the Middle East Conference, 
all Arab states can be expected to join the initiative. The preparatory meeting of Arab foreign 
ministries’ senior ofﬁ cials in May 2012 furthermore demonstrates the seriousness of Arab 
preparations. The working paper submitted by the Arab League to the 2012 Preparatory 
Committee for the next NPT review cycle afﬁ rmed that the MEC should be attended by all 
states of the Middle East, “given that it is the participating regional States that will determine 
the follow-up procedures that will be undertaken by the facilitator.” ii However, there are 
two issues that may prevent a pan-Arab participation and/or position: Syria, which has 
been subject to Arab League suspension and sanctions, may decide to stay at home; and 
Palestine, still a state ‘in nascendi’, is not yet in a position to ofﬁ cially join or sign the relevant 
treaties and initiatives.
Arab states have been quite clear about their expectations regarding the Middle East 
Conference: “any resolutions that are adopted by the 2012 Conference should propose 
genuine steps, speciﬁ c undertakings and a schedule for talks on establishing a zone free 
of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.” iii Moreover, the 2012 
Arab League Summit’s declaration emphasized the need to “come up with practical results 
that clearly lead to the establishment of the free-zone” pinpointing that “the failure to achieve 
the goals of the 2012 Conference will push Arab states in the direction of searching for 
decisive steps to insure its safety.” iv However, the dramatic changes unfolding in many of 
its member states will continue to transform the pan-Arab body in new ways: since the Arab 
uprisings began, the Arab League has transformed itself from a “gloriﬁ ed debating society” 
into an organization with enhanced credibility and diplomatic standing thanks to a number 
of bold actions that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago.v
Besides the Arab League the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is usually also an important format in setting i. 
arms control related to a common Arab position, and its secretary at the moment is Mohamed Morsi, the 
newly elected President of Egypt, but in August 2012 the NAM rotating presidency will be assumed by Iran. 
What impact, if any, that will have on the elaboration of the common Arab position within the NAM is not 
clear.
Working paper concerning implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, submitted by the ii. 
United Arab Emirates, on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States, to the First Preparatory 
Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.17, p. 3.
League of Arab States Working paper, op. cit., p. 4.iii. 
Declaration of Baghdad, The Arab Summit Conference, March 29, 2012. Online, available at iv. 
http://www.arabsummit.iq/ArticleShow.aspx?ID=28 (July 3, 2012).
Khaled Elgindy (2012) ‘A New and Improved Arab League?’, Up Front, Brookings Institution, March 27, v. 
2012. Online, available at http://www.brookings.edu/up-front/posts/2012/03/27-arab-league-elgindy 
(July 25, 2012).
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For Jordan the Arab Spring’s greatest 
impact has been to increase the kingdom’s 
vulnerability: ﬁ rst, by exposing the 
country’s economic crisis and, second, 
through events in the region, especially 
in Egypt and Syria. The inﬂ ux of about 
140,000 Syrian refugees is a further 
cause of concern. The chaos following 
protests in other Arab states seems to 
have convinced Jordanians that the 
path of political reform is safer 
than that of regime change.34 Besides the 
general security implications of having 
armed conﬂ icts in neighboring countries, 
Jordan should not neglect its huge 
Palestinian community (approximately 
60 percent) and should monitor the
situation between Israel and the 
Palestinians, as well as the relations 
of Egypt and Syria to Israel. Although 
a new Arab-Israeli war is not 
expected, there is the fear that any 
dimension of the crisis could easily 
escalate into one. At the same time, 
Jordan seems to be increasingly gravi-
tating in the Saudi orbit. It enthusiastically 
responded to the offer of membership 
in the Gulf Cooperation Council and as 
a result reveived billions of dollars of 
economic aid from Riad.35
Jordan has never pursued WMD programs 
and is a party to all the relevant multina-
tional arms control agreements (NPT, 
BTWC, CWC, CTBT). Accordingly, 
Jordan is viewed positively when it comes 
to non-proliferation and disarmament to 
the extent that its plans to start a civilian 
nuclear program have not raised any 
security concerns. However, in the past 
U.S. diplomats have tried to prevent Jordan 
from getting the necessary technology 
for uranium enrichment and proposed 
to purchase nuclear fuel on the open 
markets.36 Since reform demands decisively 
focus on domestic matters, no change is 
expected in Jordan’s foreign policy and 
arms control activities. Jordan will most 
probably participate in the Middle East 
Conference and should there be a joint 
Arab position, it will support that.
The Arab Spring and the 
Regional Environment: Israel, 
Palestine, and Turkey
The Arab Spring developments in a variety 
of Middle Eastern countries have already 
had repercussions on states that were not 
directly affected by it. Israel, Palestine, 
and Turkey have felt the winds of change 
sweeping across the region and are in the 
process of responding to these events. 
Palestine
Though the Palestinians were the ﬁ rst in 
the Middle East to initiate mass waves 
of demonstrations and riots in the two 
Intifadas, they have recently not undergone 
an Arab Spring-like uprising but remained 
relatively calm. The most important issues 
are still the conﬂ ict with Israel and the 
relationship between Fatah and Hamas (see 
POLICY BRIEF No. 3 by Margret Johannsen 
et al.). However, the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip saw rallies calling for an end 
to the political split between Fatah and 
Hamas. National unity was presented by 
demonstrators as a national goal and as a 
means to end Israeli occupation.
Palestinians viewed the Arab Spring as 
a window of opportunity, hoping that 
the emerging new Arab regimes would 
be more supportive of the Palestinian 
cause. This was proved by the change 
in the Egyptian attitude to Hamas, the 
fundamental improvements at the Rafah 
crossing, and the Egyptian effort to prevent 
Israeli aggression against Gaza. Egypt 
is expected to play a constructive role in 
mediation between Israel and Palestine 
on the one hand, and between Fatah and 
Hamas on the other. It is also expected that 
under the greater umbrella of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Hamas will become more 
moderate and eventually be integrated into 
the political system.
The Arab Spring demonstrations focused 
on internal issues by calling for democracy, 
justice, and social equality; however, they 
were silent about freeing Palestine. Thus, 
when it comes to their struggle against 
the Israeli occupation, the Palestinians 
have modest expectations of the newly 
created Arab regimes. Stabilizing their 
rule at home will limit the Arab states’ 
ability, if not their desire, to take a clear 
stance in favor of a historic reconcili-
ation with Israel and support for negotia-
tions between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority (PA). Furthermore, the concern 
about widespread public protests in neigh-
boring states will make it hard for the 
PA to soften its demands and bargaining 
stance as preconditions for resuming talks 
with Israel.
However, the positive global and regional 
resonance of the Arab Spring events did 
provide an opportunity for bringing 
»Israel, Palestine, and Turkey
have felt the winds of change 
sweeping across the region.«
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the issue of the Palestinian statehood 
before the United Nations in September 
2011. The international sympathy for the 
Palestinian case and the Palestinian diplo-
matic offensive at the UN has freed the 
PA from the immediate need to relax its 
conditions for engaging in dialogue with 
Israel and compromise on the parameters 
of an agreement. The extended political 
deadlock has also allowed the PA to 
attempt to regulate relations with Hamas 
with little fear of signiﬁ cant damage to its 
image.
As far as the Middle East Conference is 
concerned, Palestine, which is not yet 
recognized as a state, is not a party to the 
major multilateral arms control agreements. 
However, it can be assumed that repre-
sentatives of the Palestinian Authority will 
join the Middle East Conference.
Israel
The recent escalation in regional instability 
appeared to actually narrow the chances 
of reviving the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process. From Israel’s perspective, the 
transformations in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, 
Syria, and Yemen make the region look 
more chaotic and dangerous as well as 
more Islamic and, therefore, more threat-
ening. This strengthens the voices against 
taking risks and it moves the country in the 
direction of isolation, including the quite 
unlikely dissolution of existing peace treaties 
(with Egypt and with Jordan). Accordingly, 
the immediate fear for Israel is the policy 
of the new Egyptian leadership, which 
seems to have already lost control over the 
Sinai Peninsula. However, in August 2012 
Egyptian President Morsi sent soldiers into 
the peninsula as a reaction to the shooting 
of 16 Egyptian soldiers by terrorists. This 
was a move that caused severe criticism 
among his followers within the Muslim 
Brotherhood, but was welcomed by the 
Israeli government.
The ‘only democracy’ in the Middle East, as 
Israel proudly describes itself, has concerns 
regarding the political transitions of its 
neighbors. Israeli analysts, and even more 
Israeli ofﬁ cials, fear that the overwhelming 
support for Islamic parties throughout the 
region demonstrates that the Arab world 
is not really moving towards democracy. 
“Egypt will go in the direction of Iran,”37 
argued Benjamin Netanyahu before the 
fall of Mubarak, highlighting the fact that 
the only revolution that took place in the 
Middle East before 2011 resulted in the rise 
of an Islamic leadership and did not yield 
the expected fruits in terms of civil and 
human rights. 
However, the Arab Spring might also 
provide an opportunity for improving 
relations between Israel and its neighbors. 
If the peace treaties with Egypt and 
Jordan remain in force, they would gain in 
legitimacy by having been endorsed by an 
elected majority. Moreover, moving towards 
reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas 
was only possible thanks to the mediation 
of a post-Mubarak Egypt. This split was 
seen by Israel as precluding engagement 
with a legitimate Palestinian leadership. 
Another possibly positive element is the 
rapid change in Hamas’ course: although 
it still supports a continued struggle that 
includes violent means, the pressures from 
the wider Muslim Brotherhood umbrella, 
to which it historically belongs, are likely 
to turn it into a more ‘normal’ political 
power.
Overall, an attractive offer to the 
Palestinians would extricate Israel from its 
growing isolation in the international and 
regional arenas, and it would strengthen 
Fatah and Mahmoud Abbas in their 
internal struggle for legitimacy and 
leadership. Failing to restart the 
peace process might even lead to a 
Palestinian revolution, not only against 
its own leadership but also against the 
occupying power. Because the Palestinian 
problem is still a core Arab issue, its 
solution would undoubtedly create a 
better atmosphere between Israel and 
the Arab states. Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf States, as well as the North African 
countries, would gratefully accept such a 
development. “Beyond the usual reasons 
that peace is desirable security for 
Israel, justice and dignity for the 
Palestinians, and greater stability for the 
region a successful peace process would 
take away one of the greatest rhetorical 
weapons of extremists and make it harder 
for demagogues to create an escalatory 
spiral.”38
Yet, resistance to change will remain strong 
in Israel and a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude seems 
to prevail. With Syria falling deeper into 
civil strife and the Muslim Brotherhood 
winning elections in Egypt, Israel’s 
concerns are that it will end up being the 
loser in the Arab Spring events. Despite 
the importance for Israel of a dialogue (or 
lack thereof) with the Palestinians, Israel’s 
most pressing security concern remains the 
»The Arab Spring might also 
provide an opportunity for 
improving relations between 
Israel and its neighbors. If the 
peace treaties with Egypt and 
Jordan remain in force, they 
would gain in legitimacy by 
having been endorsed by an 
elected majority.«
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Iranian nuclear program. Unfortunately, 
even peace with the Palestinians will not 
be enough to reverse that threat. 
Irrespective of these new develop-
ments, Israel’s position on the Middle 
East Conference remains unchanged: 
the Netanyahu government has neither 
rejected nor conﬁ rmed its participation 
in the MEC (see POLICY BRIEF No. 2 by 
Bernd W. Kubbig and Christian Weidlich 
et al.).
Turkey
Turkey has often been cited as a model 
for state-building efforts in the changing 
Arab states. Ankara’s nearly eight decades 
of political practice that combines a liberal 
market economy with secular democracy 
in a predominantly Muslim society, has 
made the ‘Turkish model’ a touchstone for 
the Arab transition. The 2002 ‘electoral 
revolution’ brought to power the Justice 
and Development Party of Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, replacing the Kemalist cadres 
with a new Islamic leadership that “also 
believes in modernization in the Western-
democratic style and even in the secularity 
of the state.”39 The Turkish alchemy of 
democracy and religion would be a needed 
model for those Arab states which are 
starting the path towards democracy, 
possibly demonstrating that radicalism 
is not a necessary component of political 
Islam.
Yet, while parts of the international 
community see the Turkish experience as 
a factor for stability and debate about its 
replication in other parts of the Middle 
East, others warn that the international 
community would be mistaken to present 
Turkey as the model for Arab states in 
transformation. Turkey can only be a 
source of inspiration for some of the 
Arab countries which are ready and able 
to beneﬁ t from Ankara’s experiences. 
The Turkish understanding of secularism 
reﬂ ects the maturity of its Islamic parties, 
which have the experience of legitimizing 
themselves within the parliamentary 
system. The attractiveness of the Turkish 
model lies in its exceptional economic 
development. In this regard, Turkey’s 
policies before the outbreak of Arab 
revolts – emphasizing the ﬂ ow of people, 
trade, and ideas – could still be helpful in 
the creation and projection of the basic 
norms of democracy and a liberal market 
economy in the region even under current 
conditions.
Concerning the MEC dimension, Turkey 
is likely not to be a (full-ﬂ etched) member 
of the Middle East Conference since it is 
not considered to be part of the region. 
However, as an important geographically 
adjacent player, one cannot rule out that 
Ankara will be involved in the process 
starting in Helsinki.
Conclusions and 
Recommendations
Regardless of the theoretical debate over 
the term ‘revolution’, the events that started 
in Tunisia and spread to other Arab states 
constituted the ﬁ rst successful attempt 
in the Arab world to topple authoritarian 
regimes through popular uprisings. The 
Arab world witnessed regime changes solely 
through military coups, mainly during the 
1950s and 1960s. And though these changes 
were depicted as revolutions, the fact of the 
matter is that they usually represented only 
a change in the governing elite. 
The Arab Spring has shown that the 
‘impossible is possible’ and that even in 
places where popular protests traditionally 
have not been tolerated, a bottom-up 
transformation process can be launched 
from the streets. Moreover, the dissatis-
faction of Arab youths is likely to persist 
if not adequately addressed by the reform 
policies of the remaining or newly formed 
regimes. Yet, demonstrators should develop 
organized structures and a political agenda 
to participate in decision making. The 
Arab world is facing unprecedented trans-
formation, a process few analysts foresaw 
based on the previous stability of Arab 
autocracies.
Democratization in the Arab World?
It is usually taken for granted that the 
transformation, which has begun in the 
Arab world, would necessarily lead to the 
democratization of the region. One and 
a half year later, however, it is increas-
ingly evident that although ‘democracy’ 
is a keyword in the political rhetoric, the 
ongoing transformations are far from the 
democratic transitions initially hoped for. 
On the one hand, there is a democratic 
deﬁ cit from the Western point of view if 
in free and fair elections Islamist parties 
are winning the biggest share of the votes 
like in Tunisia or Egypt. Hopefully, once 
these parties get into a majority governing 
position, they will not turn their backs on 
the democratic process that made it possible 
for them to gain power, and they will follow 
»The Arab Spring has 
shown that the ‘impossible is 
possible’.«
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in Tunisia, Egypt, or Libya, while in the 
Arab monarchies, except for Bahrain, the 
old social contracts still go unchallenged. 
However, ordinary citizens are likely to 
put pressure on the governmental sphere 
through protests to defend what they 
consider fair and legitimate. In addition, 
the new ‘language of Tahrir Square’ – the 
discourse of human rights, democracy, and 
pluralism – is taking root. This can also 
be seen in the 2012 Arab League Summit’s 
declaration, which praised the political 
changes and developments that took place 
in the Arab region, along with the big 
democratic steps and directions that raised 
the status of the Arab people.
The Arab Spring and the 
Middle East Conference
The current focus of the regional states 
affected by the Arab Spring is mostly on 
domestic issues. But this does not exclude 
that the transformations could – in the 
mid and long term – have an impact on 
the countries’ speciﬁ c foreign policies and, 
therefore, on the readiness to discuss and 
negotiate disarmament agreements. It will 
also remain vital to look at these issues on 
a country-by-country basis. The forces of 
continuity may vary from state to state. But 
we assume that greater inﬂ uence of public 
opinion will be manifest in foreign policy 
choices which are unpredictable from 
today’s perspective. 
For the Facilitator of the Middle East 
Conference and his team the following 
factors should form a checklist of issues 
requiring immediate attention: 
To closely monitor how domestic • 
events positively or negatively affect 
the decisions of involved actors. The 
ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST – POLICY BRIEF NOS. 9/10 • AUGUST 2012
The Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East wishes to thank its generous sponsors, 
the Foreign Ministry of Norway, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 
the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and the Protestant Church of Hesse and Nassau.
Editor/Project Coordinator: Adj. Prof. Dr. Bernd W. Kubbig 
Co-Editors: Roberta Mulas, MA and Christian Weidlich, MA
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 
Baseler Straße 27-31, 
D-60329 Frankfurt am Main, 
Phone: +49-69-95910436, Fax: +49-69-558481, 
E-Mail: kubbig@hsfk.de, 
Internet: www.academicpeaceorchestra.com
The views presented by the 
authors do not necessarily 
represent those of the project 
coordinator, editors, sponsors, or PRIF.
© 2012 ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA
MIDDLE EAST and Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
All rights reserved.
Layout: Anke Maria Meyer
About the ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST (APOME)
The ORCHESTRA is the follow-up project of the “Multilateral Study Group (MSG) on the Establishment of a Missile Free Zone in the Middle East”. 
The ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST is a classical Track II initiative: it consists of some 70 experts – mainly from the Middle East/Gulf, one 
of the most conﬂ ict-ridden areas of the world. The ORCHESTRA is meeting regularly in working groups (CHAMBER ORCHESTRA UNITs) on speciﬁ c topics 
in the context of a workshop cycle from 2011-2014. The main goal of this initiative is to shape the 2012 Middle East Conference on the estab-
lishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles agreed upon by the international community in May 2010.
For this reason, these experts develop ideas, concepts, and background information in a series of POLICY BRIEFS which are the results of 
intense discussions within the CHAMBER ORCHESTRA UNITS. In this framework, the broader normative Cooperative Security Concept will be further 
developed, embedded, and institutionalized in the region. At the same time, the ORCHESTRA meetings serve as venues for conﬁ dence building 
among the experts. The networking activities of PRIF’s Project Group are documented by the ATLAS on Track II research activities in or about 
the Middle East/Gulf region.
the
Ministry of Foreign A airs
Further Reading
Jean-Pierre Filiu (2011) The Arab Revolution:  
Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising, 
London: Hurst.
Erzsébet N. Rózsa (2011) ‘Arab Awakening,  
or a New Regional Order Emerging in the 
Middle East?’, International Issues & Slovak 
Foreign Policy Affairs, 20(2): 3–20.
Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren (2012) The  
Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, 
Counter-revolution and the Making of a New 
Era, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
James L. Gelvin (2012) The Arab Uprisings:  
What Everyone Needs to Know, New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Toby Manhire (2012) The Arab Spring:  
Rebellion, Revolution, and a New World 
Order, London: Random House.
Joel Peters (ed.) (2012) The European Union  
and the Arab Spring: Promoting Democracy 
and Human Rights in the Middle East, 
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
emergence of civil society actors as 
cooperation partners could be of great 
value.
To check which country will take the • 
Arab leadership in foreign and arms 
control policies. Two main candidates 
come to mind as possible agenda setters 
for the MEC: Egypt for its historical 
relevance in disarmament and Saudi 
Arabia for its newly developed Arab 
leadership.
To evaluate how the Arab League will • 
act as the consensus-building forum for 
Arab positions. Whether and how to 
optimize its constructive role remains to 
be seen.
Not to ignore those countries which • 
so far have remained unaffected by 
the Arab Spring in the Middle East – 
Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, UAE, Iraq, and 
Lebanon – but which will nevertheless 
be to different degrees important for 
the MEC process. This would especially 
apply to Qatar which has emerged as a 
most visible regional actor with a ﬂ exible 
foreign policy proﬁ le which could be 
used for the beneﬁ t of a successful and 
sustainable Middle East Conference.
Arms control, especially in the realm 
of WMD, is usually considered an elite 
exercise belonging to the state’s capacity. 
This does not mean, however, that the 
popular events would not indirectly have 
an impact on arms control or that arms 
control would not resurface at some point 
as an issue of popular concern. Both the 
tensions between Israel and Iran over the 
nuclear issue and the fact that nuclear 
weapons are sometimes considered a sign 
of modernization, have the potential to 
mobilize public opinion. 
The emerging political structures in the 
Arab world will continue to be unstable in 
the short run. We may witness instability 
and the possible use of violence by govern-
ments and underprivileged tribal, sectarian, 
or religious groups, particularly in hetero-
geneous societies. Nevertheless, emerging 
political structures will be more legitimate 
and more responsive to the demands of 
the people. It is indeed possible that Arabs 
came together to bid farewell to an age of 
quiescence. n
